

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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downgrade  
EACD/RS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
October 26, 1962

~~EXCISE~~

TO: U - Mr. Ball

R

Attached is a piece of staff work done urgently for Ambassador Thompson. I understand the urgency of the assumption may have changed during the last few hours, but the staff work is equally valuable regardless of the military assumptions.

Essentially it is a graduated series of five political operations centering in the UN, and "escalation" of interdependent political steps with a timetable for each.

IO - Marian Cleveland

Attachment.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/SDC/MR

REVIEWED by *Padgett*

DATE *2/16/68*

( ) RELEASE ( ) DECLASSIFY  
(X) EXCISE ( ) DECLASSIFY in PART  
( ) DENY ( ) Non-responsive info.  
FOI, EO or PA exemptions *101, 105*

TS authority to:

( ) CLASSIFY as *SECRET*, OADR  
(X) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) G, OADR

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October 26, 1962

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Thompson

SUBJECT: Operation Raincoat

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Superficially it makes a difference whether, in the staff work on Operation Raincoat, one starts with the desire to carry out an air strike in Cuba within the next few days, and prepare the way for it politically as best we can; or whether we assume that the purpose of our political operations is to make an air strike unnecessary by solving the problem it is designed to solve. We get rid of those dangerous or potentially dangerous missiles on the island. *(b6)*

In practice, this apparent difference disappears. Whether one wants to make an air strike or wants to avoid an air strike, the political scenario is the same. Basically, it is to exhaust every peaceful remedy that may appear to be an alternative to the direct use of force.

Obviously, we have to set our own deadlines on these limits. These deadlines, which should be set on the basis of hard intelligence with a minimum content of our own natural impatience, set a limit on what can and should be done politically.

Starting from where we now are, with a political negotiation in which the President's good faith is heavily engaged, I have described five different kinds of political operations. As you will see, they are graduated with respect to (a) breadth of subject matter that would be thrown into the negotiating pot; (b) numbers of countries involved; and (c) sense of urgency.

The number of days which might be required at a minimum to get to each of these operations and to get through each of them is set forth in the following table:

	Time from now to start of operation	Minimum time to complete operation
Op. #1     Playing out the present political situation	Now	2-3 days
Op. #2     "Cease and Desist" approach in Security Council	2-3 days	1 day
Op. #3     Brazilian Proposal in Security Council	3-4 days	2-3 days

*(cont'd)*

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- 2 -

		<u>Time from now to start of operation</u>	<u>Minimum time to complete operation</u>
Op. #4	Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly	5-7 days	3-4 days
Op. #5	Summitry in the General Assembly	8-11 days	2 days

6(1), 6(5)

Harlan Cleveland

IO:HC:mtb

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1. Playing Out the Present Political Talks.

We have started down a political track. The President has told the world, through the Secretary General of the United Nations, that he is quite ready for U.S. representatives to talk about satisfactory arrangements and the existing threat. Chairman Khrushchev has also accepted the proposal for talks. These talks started this afternoon, with Messrs. Stevenson and Zorin seeing U Thant separately. They cannot be abandoned summarily in a matter of hours without grave danger to our political case.

Ambassador Stevenson's instructions are to try in the first instance "to achieve a condition which would involve (i) no more offensive arms being delivered to Cuba, (ii) no further build-up of missile sites or bomber facilities, and (iii) any existing Cuban nuclear strike capability being kept inoperable."

Although the instructions were drafted and reviewed by all concerned only this morning, they do not adequately reflect a mood of urgency [that could produce an air strike within the next few days.] Therefore, a first objective [whether the goal is to prevent an air strike or to justify the latter if it is undertaken] should be to make unmistakably clear that the central purpose of Ambassador Stevenson's talks with the Secretary General and with the Soviets is to get the missile buildup stopped and to make sure that no missiles are operational.

This has

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- 2 -

This has already been done in the first meetings with the Secretary General. It should be done in the strongest terms in the first meeting between Ambassador Stevenson and the Soviets. It should also be done in some fashion publicly; this process seems already to be underway, judging from the dopesters in the papers this afternoon.

In the New York discussions with the Soviets, I think we should come close to making the halting of the buildup and the inoperability of any existing missiles a precondition to going ahead with the talks. If we do not promote this point to the status of the major objective, we will continue to mislead most of the world into making the same mistake that the Secretary General has already made (see telegram 1479 from New York, reporting the first conversation between the Secretary General and Yeast and Plimpton): namely, that our quarantine was established to deal with the problem of shipments into Cuba, that it is not relevant to the existing missile buildup within Cuba, and that our quarantine can therefore be traded for a control of military shipments while the missile buildup goes on.

The general objective of the Stevenson-Thant-Zorin talks, therefore, is to get either (a) a stoppage of work on the missile sites and arrangements to make sure the missiles are non-operational or (b) a clear Soviet refusal to deal with this problem satisfactorily.

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2. In the Security Council

We have pending before the Security Council a resolution which contains the following elements:

- a. Dismantle and withdraw missiles and other offensive weapons;
- b. UN observer corps to assure compliance;
- c. Terminate quarantine when compliance assured;
- d. US and USSR get together and talk.

The Security Council has adjourned sine die, and we cannot convene a meeting to bring our resolution to a vote unless the current "quiet diplomacy" track has clearly come to naught.

If the private negotiations around U Thant's coffee table do come to naught, we would still lose some support in the eyes of UN members if we pressed our resolution to a veto. To do this would appear to some as essentially a cold war maneuver unlikely to promote peaceful settlement of the basic issue.

More attractive politically would be an alternative ploy: to withhold a vote on all three pending resolutions (ours, the ~~Soviet~~, and the UAR's) and submit an alternative proposal which would include: (a) a call on the Soviet Union to take steps to withdraw the missiles and the missile sites from Cuba; (b) the elements contained in the substantive position taken by the United States in the U Thant discussions; and (c) provide for stationing of United Nations observers at Guantanamo as a form of political

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of political interference. This cease and desist approach would probably get seven supporting votes if the Soviets were clearly responsible for the breakdown of the discussions with Thant. Such a resolution would be vetoed by the Soviet Union.

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2. Brazilian Proposal in the Security Council

Assuming the cease and desist phase failed as a result of a Soviet veto, we should promote in the Security Council a resolution incorporating the Brazilian ideas. The resolution would <sup>call</sup> upon the Latin American countries to negotiate arrangements for a denuclearized zone in Latin America (including Cuba), and authorizing the Secretary General to establish administrative machinery to verify and inspect such a zone. In the Council, the proposal should be limited to Latin America (i.e., not include Africa), since the primary focus would be to give the Cubans a face-saver to free themselves of the missiles and missile sites supplied to them by the Soviet Union. At this stage, it might also be desirable to consider whether the United States could provide some sort of an assurance which would diminish the fear of invasion.

60, 65

NOTE: At any time that it seems desirable to increase the sense of urgency in the Security Council, a proposal could be made under Article 28 of the Charter to hold a meeting of the Security Council at Foreign Minister or even Heads of Government level.

Attachment: Brazilian proposal, as amended by US suggestions.

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Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly  
Substantive Phase.

If the previous steps have failed, we could invoke the Uniting for Peace mechanism in the Security Council and call for an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. We would take the lead on a substantive proposal containing two principal elements:

- (a) the Brazilian idea of denuclearization, possibly broadened out to include Africa, if we find this would enhance its political support;
- (b) the "defanging" resolution (for which the Irish would be the ideal sponsors). This resolution broadens the issue by calling for the dismantling for long-range missile bases on the periphery of the nuclear powers (Turkey, as well as Cuba). It would be important that alternative means be found to take care of the quite legitimate Turkish concerns. The sea force idea referred to by ~~the~~ in his cable of yesterday appears to be a real possibility. The "defanging" proposal would be considered a very reasonable quid pro quo by a substantial majority of the members of the United Nations.

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5. Summary in the General Assembly

If all the above proposals have failed, we could then initiate a summity exercise in the General Assembly which would call for a high-level meeting between the United States and the USSR. Such a meeting should include not only Cuba on its agenda, but also Berlin, testing and disarmament, including the problem of nuclear proliferation.

The amount of time it would take to complete the above steps is flexible. It could vary from two to four weeks depending on the pace we chose. Some of the above phases could also be combined or skipped entirely if necessary.

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**EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS**

DEWGRADE ATTACHMENT  
TO SECRET - OADR

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BIAS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

October 26, 1962

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ENCLOSE

TO: G - Mr. Johnson

Attached is a piece of staff work done urgently for Ambassador Thompson. I understand the urgency of the assumption may have changed during the last few hours, but the staff work is equally valuable regardless of the military assumptions.

Essentially it is a graduated series of five political operations centering in the UN, and "escalation" of interdependent political steps with a timetable for each.

IO - Harlan Cleveland

Attachment.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

9:25 am  
OCT 26 1962

DEPUTY UNDER  
SECRETARY OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE - A CDO/MB

REVIEWED BY [Signature] DATE 10-28-62  
( ) REFERENCE ( ) DECLASSIFY  
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( ) DIRM ( ) Non-responsive info.  
FOIA, EO or PA exemptions (b)(7)

IS authority to:

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

October 26, 1962

REVIEWED by

Moskowitz

DATE 4/1/82

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Thompson

SUBJECT: Operation Raincoat

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

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The political scenario is the same. Basically, it is to exhaust every peaceful remedy that may appear to be an alternative to the direct use of force.

Obviously, we have to set our own deadlines on these limits. These deadlines, which should be set on the basis of hard intelligence with a minimum content of our own natural impatience, set a limit on what can and should be done politically.

Starting from where we now are, with a political negotiation in which the President's good faith is heavily engaged, I have described five different kinds of political operations. As you will see, they are graduated with respect to (a) breadth of subject matter that would be thrown into the negotiating pot; (b) numbers of countries involved; and (c) sense of urgency.

The number of days which might be required at a minimum to get to each of these operations and to get through each of them is set forth in the following table:

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		<u>Time from now to start of opera- tion</u>	<u>Minimum time to complete operation</u>
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Op. #5	Summitry in the General Assembly	8-11 days	2 days

Harlan Cleveland

IO:HC:mtb

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~~DECLASSIFIED~~ *SECRET* *WAS*

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1. Playing Out the Present Political Talk.

We have started down a political track. The President has told the world, through the Secretary General of the United Nations, that he is quite ready for U.S. representatives to talk about satisfactory arrangements and the existing threat. Chairman Khrushchev has also accepted the proposal for talks. These talks started this afternoon, with Messrs. Stevenson and Zorin seeing U Thant separately. They cannot be abandoned summarily in a matter of hours without grave danger to our political case.

Ambassador Stevenson's instructions are to try in the first instance "to achieve a condition which would involve (i) no more offensive arms being delivered to Cuba, (ii) no further build-up of missile sites or bomber facilities, and (iii) any existing Cuban nuclear strike capability being kept inoperable."

a first objective

It should be to make unmistakably clear that the central purpose of Ambassador Stevenson's talks with the Secretary General and with the Soviets is to get the missile buildup stopped and to make sure that no missiles are operational.

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B/A5

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This has already been done in the first meetings with the Secretary General. It should be done in the strongest terms in the first meeting between Ambassador Stevenson and the Soviets. It should also be done in some fashion publicly; this process seems already to be underway, judging from the dopesters in the papers this afternoon.

In the New York discussions with the Soviets, I think we should come close to making the halting of the buildup and the inoperability of any existing missiles a precondition to going ahead with the talks. If we do not promote this point to the status of the major objective, we will continue to mislead most of the world into making the same mistake

BIA5  
(b)(1)(c)

that our quarantine was established to deal with the problem of shipments into Cuba, that it is not relevant to the existing missile buildup within Cuba, and that our quarantine can therefore be traded for a control of military shipments while the missile buildup goes on.

The central objective of the Stevenson-Thant-Zorin talks, therefore, is to get either (a) a stoppage of work on the missile sites and arrangements to make sure the missiles are non-operational or (b) a clear Soviet refusal to deal with this problem satisfactorily.

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More attractive politically would be an alternative ploy: to withhold a vote on all three pending resolutions (ours, the Soviet's, and the UAR's) and submit an alternative proposal which would include: (a) a call on the Soviet Union to take steps to withdraw the missiles and the missile sites from Cuba; (b) the elements contained in the substantive position taken by the United States in the U Thant discussions; and (c) provide for stationing of United Nations observers at Guantanamo as a form

of political

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of political assurance. This basic and realist approach would probably get seven supporting votes if the Soviets were clearly responsible for the breakdown of the discussions with Thant. Such a resolution would be vetoed by the Soviet Union.

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3. Brazilian Proposal in the Security Council

Assuming the cease and desist phase failed as a result of a Soviet veto, we should promote in the Security Council a resolution incorporating the Brazilian ideas. The resolution would <sup>call</sup> upon the Latin American countries to negotiate arrangements for a denuclearized zone in Latin America (including Cuba), and authorizing the Secretary General to establish administrative machinery to verify and inspect such a zone. In the Council, the proposal should be limited to Latin America (i.e., not include Africa), since the primary focus would be to give the Cubans a face-saver to free themselves of the missiles and missile sites supplied to them by the Soviet Union. At this stage, it might also be desirable to consider whether the United States could provide some sort of an assurance which would diminish the fear of invasion.

NOTE: At any time that it seems desirable to increase the sense of urgency in the Security Council, a proposal could be made under Article 28 of the Charter to hold a meeting of the Security Council at Foreign Minister or even Heads of Government level.

Attachment: Brazilian proposal, as amended by US suggestions.

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4. Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly  
Substantive Phase.

If the previous steps have failed, we could invoke the Uniting for Peace mechanism in the Security Council and call for an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. We would take the lead on a substantive proposal containing two principal elements:

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5. Summitry in the General Assembly

If all the above proposals have failed, we could then initiate a summitry exercise in the General Assembly which would call for a high-level meeting between the United States and the USSR. Such a meeting should include not only Cuba on its agenda, but also Berlin, testing and disarmament, including the problem of nuclear proliferation.

The amount of time it would take to complete the above steps is flexible. It could vary from two to four weeks depending on the pace we chose. Some of the above phases could also be combined or skipped entirely if necessary.

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**EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS**

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

October 26, 1962

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TO: U - Mr. Ball

EXCISE

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Essentially it is a graduated series of five political operations centering in the UN, and "escalation" of interdependent political steps with a timetable for each.

IO - Harlan Cleveland

Attachment.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/DCG/MR

REVIEWED BY *Stokely* DATE *2/6/68*

( ) RELEASE ( ) DECLASSIFY  
(X) EXCISE ( ) DECLASSIFY in PART  
( ) DENY ( ) Non-responsive info.  
FOI, EO or PA exceptions *del*

TS authority to: *del*  
( ) CLASSIFY as *del* OADR  
(X) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C, OADR

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October 26, 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Thompson

SUBJECT: Operation RaincoatGENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Superficially it makes a difference whether, in the work on Operation Raincoat, one starts with the desire

to get rid of those dangerous or potentially dangerous missiles on the island.

In practice, this apparent difference disappears. One wants to make an air strike or wants to avoid an air strike; the political scenario is the same. Basically, it is to every peaceful remedy that may appear to be an alternative to the direct use of force.

Obviously, we have to set our own deadlines on this. These deadlines, which should be set on the basis of honest intelligence with a minimum content of our own natural inclination, set a limit on what can and should be done politically.

Starting from where we now are, with a political process in which the President's good faith is heavily engaged, I described five different kinds of political operations. I will see, they are graduated with respect to (a) breadth of subject matter that would be thrown into the negotiating process; (b) numbers of countries involved; and (c) sense of urgency.

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Op. #2	"Cease and Desist" approach in Security Council	2-3 days
Op. #3		3-4 days

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b(1), b(5)



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U S S R - 2

Time from now to  
start of opera-  
tion

Minimum time  
to complete  
operation

Op. #4

5-7 days

3-4 days

Op. #5

8-22 day:

2 days

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Harlan Cleveland

IO:HC:mtb

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1. Playing Out the Present Political Talk

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Ambassador Stevenson's instructions are to try in the

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Therefore, a first objective

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This has

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A 10x10 grid of dots. A horizontal line is drawn above the top row. In the center of the grid, there is a '2' with a horizontal line passing through its middle. The dots are arranged in a regular pattern, with some dots missing in the top row and the row containing the '2'.

This has already been done in the first meetings with the Secretary General. It should be done in the strongest terms in the first meeting between Ambassador Stevenson and the Soviets. It should also be done in some fashion publicly; this process seems already to be underway, judging from the posters in the papers this afternoon.

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2. In the Security Council:

No have pending before the Security Council a resolution which contains the following elements:

- a. Dismantle and withdraw missiles and other offensive weapons;
- b. UN observer corps to assure compliance;
- c. Terminate quarantine when compliance assured;
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The Security Council has adjourned sine die, and we cannot convene a meeting to bring our resolution to a vote unless the current "quiet diplomacy" track has clearly come to naught.

If the private negotiations around U Thant's coffee table do come to naught, we would still lose some support in the eyes of UN members if we pressed our resolution to a veto. To do this would appear to come as essentially a cold war maneuver unlikely to promote peaceful settlement of the basic issue.

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5. Summitry in the General Assembly

If all the above proposals have failed, we could then initiate a summitry exercise in the General Assembly which would call for a high-level meeting between the United States and the USSR. Such a meeting should include not only Cuba on its agenda, but also Berlin, testing and disarmament, including the problem of nuclear proliferation.

The amount of time it would take to complete the above steps is flexible. It could vary from two to four weeks depending on the pace we chose. Some of the above phases could also be combined or skipped entirely if necessary.

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OADR